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Abstract: Theories of tort law have focused on the breach and causation components 
of negligence, saying little if anything about duty.  This paper provides a positive 
economic theory of duty doctrine.  The theory that best explains duty doctrines in 
tort law is the same as the theory that explains strict liability doctrine.  The core 
function of both sets of doctrines is to regulate the frequency or scale of activities 
that have substantial external effects.  Strict liability aims to suppress or tax activities 
that carry unusually large external costs.  Duty doctrines, especially those relieving 
actors of a duty of care, serve several functions, but one important class encourages 
or subsidizes activities that carry substantial external benefits.  Another class of duty-
relieving doctrines serves as complements to property rules.  Still another class of 
duty-relieving doctrines serves to permit markets to function without distortions 
created by liability.  
                                                 
∗ Professor Law, Boston University, knhylton@bu.edu.  This paper was presented at the Fordham 
Law School conference “The Internal Point of View in Law and Ethics”.  For helpful comments I 
thank Youngjae Lee, Benjamin Zipursky, Katrina Wyman and other conference participants. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Torts textbooks say that a negligence claim consists of four components: duty, 
breach, causation, and damages.  The plaintiff must show, or at least the court must 
be prepared to assume, that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to take care.  If 
the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, the plaintiff will be permitted to 
prove that the defendant breached the duty of care.  The third component consists of 
the plaintiff’s proof that the defendant’s breach caused his injury, and the final 
component is the plaintiff’s proof that he suffered a compensable injury. 
 
Theories of tort law have focused on the breach and causation components of 
negligence, saying little if anything about duty.1  Indeed, the two most 
comprehensive consequentialist efforts to explain tort law, the utilitarian analysis of 
Holmes,2 and the economic analysis of Posner,3 have focused almost entirely on 
breach and causation issues while virtually ignoring the duty question.4 
 
My goal in this paper is to fill the space left largely untouched by Holmes and Posner 
by providing an economic framework that explains duty doctrine.  I hope to make 
clear that duty doctrine is in no sense inconsistent with economic rationales of tort 
law.5  Moreover, providing a positive economic theory of duty doctrine leads to a 
more comprehensive synthesis of the economic literature on torts; specifically by 
showing the connection within the context of negligence doctrine between property 
rules, which enjoin conduct, and liability rules, which merely tax conduct.6 
 
The theory that best explains duty doctrines in tort law is the same as the theory that 
explains strict liability doctrine.  The core function of both sets of doctrines is to 
                                                 
1 For criticism of the lack of attention to duty doctrine in modern torts scholarship, see John C. P. 
Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1733 (1988); 
Goldberg and Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 Vand. 
L. Rev. 657 (2001). 
2 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (1881). 
3 William M Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (Cambridge, MA: 
Harv. Univ Press, 1987). 
4 To be fair, Posner did examine the duty issue in a narrow setting in his article on rescue, see Landes 
and Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and 
Altruism, 7 J. Leg. Stud. 83 (1978).  The Landes-Posner analysis of rescue anticipates, in some 
respects, the argument of this paper.  However, the Landes-Posner article on rescue does not claim to 
set out a general theory of duty doctrine, which is the aim of this paper.      
5 There is a more general critique of consequentialist, or sanction-centered, theories of law that asserts 
that they are inadequate because they ignore the internal sense of obligation that is perceived by actors 
in advanced legal systems.  See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1994).  The lack of attention to 
duty doctrine reflected in the consequentialist approach could be viewed as an important fact 
supporting this internal-viewpoint critique.  Looking from this perspective, this paper’s message is 
that consequentialist theories are quite capable of explaining duty doctrine. 
6 In particular, duty doctrine provides a link, in the context of negligence law, between the property 
and liability rules initially identified in Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed,  Property Rules, 
Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).  For 
discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 21 and 22. 
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regulate the frequency or scale of activities that have substantial external effects.  
Strict liability aims to suppress or tax activities that carry unusually large external 
costs.  Duty doctrines, especially those relieving actors of a duty of care, serve 
several functions, but one important class encourages or subsidizes activities that 
carry substantial external benefits.  Another class of duty-relieving doctrines serves 
as complements to property rules.  And still another class of duty-relieving doctrines 
serves to permit markets to function without distortions created by liability. 
 
While the traditional economic approach to tort law focuses on care or instantaneous 
precaution decisions, this paper focuses on activity decisions – how much to engage 
in activities that impose uncompensated costs or benefits on others.  In this analysis 
four types of rule can be identified in terms of their activity effects: property rules, 
which prohibit activity; strict liability rules, which tax activity without prohibiting; 
negligence rules, which do not affect activity levels; and no-duty rules, which 
subsidize activity.  I use the framework developed here to explain doctrines such as 
the rescue rule (the absence of a general duty to rescue), the duties of landowners, 
and other pockets of law in which courts have consistently relieved some actor of a 
duty to take care. 
 
 
II. A Skeletal Theory 
 
A. Traditional approach and its shortcomings 
 
The traditional economic analysis of tort law takes the famous balancing test of the 
Learned Hand formula as the default rule for questions of liability.7  Under the Hand 
balancing test, one should compare the benefits of taking additional care, in terms of 
expected injury costs avoided, to the burden of taking additional care.  It is 
sometimes described as the BPL test, where B represents the burden, P the 
probability of an injury, and L the dollar amount of the injury.  Under the Hand 
balancing test, a court should hold a defendant liable when he failed to care in a 
setting in which the burden of additional care is less than the expected injury costs 
that could have been avoided (B < PL). 
 
One does not need to have an interest in economics to see the applicability of 
economic reasoning to the Hand formula.  The economic efficiency rationale for the 
Hand formula is easy to state.8  If the cost of taking care is less than the expected 
injury costs that could be avoided by taking care, the actor should be encouraged to 
take care in order to reduce overall social costs.  In other words, social welfare is 
                                                 
7 The Learned Hand formula was articulated by Judge Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 
159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).  For extensive treatments of the traditional economic approach see 
William M Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of  Tort Law (Cambridge, MA: 
Harv. Univ Press, 1987); Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law (Cambridge, MA: 
Harv. Univ. Press, 1987).  
8 Of course, this should not be taken to mean that it is obvious.  Indeed, the economic efficiency 
rationale was first articulated only thirty years ago, see Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 
J Legal Stud. 29 (1972).  
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higher when the actor takes care than when he does not take care.  However, if the 
cost of taking care is greater than the expected injury costs of not taking care, it 
would be economically inefficient to take care. 
 
Calabresi, Posner, and Shavell have modified this approach by recognizing the 
importance of distinguishing care level and activity level concerns.9  One can reduce 
the likelihood of an accident by taking care, or by not acting at all.  For example, one 
can reduce the likelihood of a traffic injury occurring by driving with greater care, or 
by not driving at all.  The decision not to drive, or to drive less frequently, is an 
activity level decision, while the decision to drive more slowly is a care level 
decision. 
 
Distinguishing activity level and care level effects permits one to make an economic 
case for choosing strict liability over negligence.  Since actors will take care under 
both the negligence and strict liability rules, strict liability is preferable to negligence 
only if it is desirable to reduce the activity level.  It might be desirable to reduce the 
activity level if, for example, taking extra care will do little to reduce the frequency 
of injury.10   
 
To sum up, the traditional economic approach to tort law treats the Hand balancing 
test as the default rule, and strict liability as an option that should be adopted when it 
is desirable to reduce activity levels.  The traditional approach has been applied 
largely to negligence law, and has been successful in explaining negligence 
doctrine.11   
 
Surprisingly, in view of its success in explaining negligence doctrine, the traditional 
economic approach has so far not had as much success in providing positive theories 
of two broad areas of tort doctrine: duty and strict liability.12  The traditional 
economic approach, largely due to Posner, has hardly mentioned duty doctrine, save 
for the special case of rescue.13  In this sense, the traditional economic model has 
followed the course set by the utilitarian analysis of Holmes, which also failed to 
find a role for duty doctrine in tort law.14 
 
                                                 
9 Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (Yale Univ. Press, 1970); 
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, supra note 7; Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus 
Negligence, 9 J Leg. Stud. 1 (1980).  For a critique of the Posner-Shavell approach as a theory of the 
case law, see Stephen Gilles, Rule-Based Negligence and the Regulation of Activity Levels, 2 J. Leg. 
Stud. 319 (1992). 
10 This view of the purpose of strict liability was stressed by Judge Posner in Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. 
v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990). 
11 See, e.g., Landes and Posner, supra note 7. 
12 Hylton, Theory of Tort Doctrine and the Restatement of Torts, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1413 (2001). 
13 Landes and Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of 
Law and Altruism, 7 J. Leg. Stud. 83 (1978). 
14 In particular, Holmes apparently did not see a need to relieve actors of a duty of care.  See Oliver 
Wendell Holmes Jr., The Theory of Torts, 7 Am L. Rev. 652, 660 (1873) (endorsing a general duty of 
“all the world to all the world”)).  See also, Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1. 
 4
The same can be said of strict liability.  The argument that strict liability should be 
chosen over negligence when it is desirable to reduce activity levels begs the 
question rather than provide a theory of strict liability.  Why should we prefer to 
reduce activity levels?  The traditional approach, reflected in the work of Posner and 
Shavell and put most clearly in application in Judge Posner’s Indiana Harbor Belt 
R.R. decision, seems to answer that question by saying that we should adopt strict 
liability when due care is insufficient to eliminate accidents.15  But due care is never 
sufficient to eliminate accidents, so this theory suggests that strict liability should be 
adopted across the board in place of the negligence rule in tort law.16  Moreover, 
there are some instances, such as zoos, in which substantial risk remains after the 
defendant has exercised due care, and yet courts choose not to adopt strict liability. 
 
It happens that the concurrent shortcomings of the traditional economic approach to 
tort law in providing positive theories of duty doctrine and of strict liability doctrine 
are not coincidental.  In other words, this is not a case in which the traditional 
approach misses two distinct targets for totally independent reasons.  The theoretical 
bases for duty doctrine and strict liability doctrine, I will argue, are essentially the 
same.  The traditional approach fails to hit the bull’s-eye of both of these targets 
because they are not distinct targets.  A theory that explains duty doctrine will also 
explain strict liability doctrine, and conversely. 
 
B. Missing Markets Framework: Explaining the Functions of Duty and Strict 
Liability Rules 
 
An alternative approach that I labeled the “missing markets” model offers a positive 
theory of strict liability doctrine.17  In this part I will argue that the missing markets 
framework also explains duty doctrine.  Indeed, the two doctrines are so closely 
related that any theory that explains one will necessarily explain the other. 
 
The missing markets framework focuses on activity levels and assumes that 
externalities are prevalent.  Strict liability is preferable to negligence if the costs 
externalized by an activity substantially outweigh the benefits externalized.18  
Negligence is preferable if there is a rough equality between externalized benefits 
and externalized costs.  A rule stating that the actor has no duty, I will argue here, is 
                                                 
15 Indiana Harbor Belt R.R., at 1176-1177.  See also, Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Tort 
Law, supra note 7, 107-118, which applies the traditional argument to several cases.  It is true that in a 
case such as blasting, a great risk of harm continues to be imposed on others even when reasonable 
care is being taken.  For that reason, the claim that strict liability is appropriate when due care is 
insufficient seems justifiable.  However, there is a residual risk of harm imposed on others in all 
circumstances of risk-creating conduct – such as driving a car.  The theory presented by Landes, 
Posner, and Shavell implies that strict liability should apply to all such conduct (including automobile 
use).  And the theory runs into difficulty in explaining the negligence rule applied to zoos, Landes and 
Posner, supra note 7, at 108.  Why should the negligence rule apply in the case of a zoo, and strict 
liability in the case of a private owner of a wild animal? 
16 Hylton, Theory of Tort Doctrine, supra note 12. 
17 Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90 Northwestern U L. Rev. 977 (1996). 
18 Id. 
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preferable to the negligence rule when the benefits externalized are considerably in 
excess of the externalized costs. 
 
Let us consider an illustration of the missing markets model.  Suppose we are 
considering some activity (e.g., the amount of automobile use or the amount of rail 
service).  The incremental or marginal private benefits of the activity are the benefits 
that accrue to the acting party, the person deciding the scale at which he will engage 
in the activity.  The marginal private benefits can be represented by a downward-
sloping schedule, somewhat like the standard demand schedule of supply-demand 
analysis.  This is the curve labeled MPB, for marginal private benefit, in Figure 1.  
The horizontal axis measures the scale of the activity.  The downward-sloping MPB 
schedule reflects the assumption of diminishing marginal utility as the activity 
increases.  Consider, for example, driving as an activity.  The incremental private 
benefits of driving are high initially, as one makes use of a car for the most important 
tasks – going to work, or obtaining necessities.  As the use of the car increases, the 
gain from an additional mile of driving declines, because the driver uses the car for 
less pressing needs – e.g., to save time traveling some distance that could easily be 
walked.   
 
The marginal cost of the activity can be represented by an upward sloping schedule, 
as shown in Figure 1, and labeled MPC, for marginal private cost.  The marginal 
private cost schedule reflects costs borne by the actor who is determining the scale at 
which to engage in the activity.  The upward slope shown in the figure assumes the 
incremental cost increases as the actor increases the scale of the activity.  For 
example, as the driver increases the frequency of use of his car, the costs incurred 
from depreciation and exposure to accidents increases. 
 
Since externalities are assumed to prevalent, I have included in Figure 1 alternative 
schedules that reflect external costs and external benefits.  If there are external 
benefits, the social benefit from the actor’s activity is simply the sum of the private 
and external benefits.  This is shown by the curves labeled MSB (low externality) and 
MSB (high externality).  For example, suppose that a driver uses his car to get to 
work.  Suppose in addition a co-worker occasionally asks the driver for a ride to 
some place on the driver’s usual path.  The fact that the driver uses his car to go to 
work provides an external benefit to the coworker.19  That external benefit is 
reflected in the vertical distance between the marginal private benefit schedule and 
the marginal social benefit schedule. 
 
The private benefit and private cost schedules allow us to find the scale of the 
activity chosen by the actor under a negligence rule – that is, the privately optimal 
scale of activity.  The negligence rule does not force the actor to bear the external 
costs of his activity when the actor is exercising due care.  Thus, when the actor is 
exercising due care, which is assumed to be the case, the scale of the activity will be 
                                                 
19 Of course, the driver may benefit directly from offering rides to coworkers, through reciprocal 
favors.  However, he is unlikely, as general matter, to value the benefits of offering rides to coworkers 
as much as the coworkers value those benefits themselves.  
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given by the activity level associated with point A in Figure 1.  This is the privately 
optimal scale because it reflects costs and benefits borne by the actor. 
 
The social benefit and social cost schedules allow us to find the socially optimal 
scale of the activity.  The reason is that an activity should be carried on a greater 
scale as long as the incremental societal benefit exceeds the incremental societal 
cost.  As long as this is true, an increasing the scale adds to society’s wealth.  When 
the marginal social benefit is just equal to the marginal social cost, the activity’s 
scale should not be increased further, since to do so would push it to the point where 
the incremental social benefit is less than the incremental social cost.  Thus, the 
optimal scale is represented by the intersection between the marginal social cost and 
marginal social benefit. 
 
If externalized costs and externalized benefits are roughly equal, then the socially 
optimal scale of the activity will be the same as the privately optimal scale of the 
activity.  This is shown by point B.  At point B, the marginal social cost, which is the 
sum of the marginal private cost and the marginal external cost, is equal to the 
marginal social benefit, which is the sum of the marginal private benefit and the 
marginal external benefit.  Alternatively, if the costs externalized by the actor are 
roughly equal to the costs externalized by the victim, the same result holds.20 
 
Suppose external benefits are relatively modest and external costs are large in 
comparison.  When external costs are considerably larger than external benefits, the 
socially optimal scale of the activity will be given by point C.  If, on the other hand, 
external benefits are far in excess of external costs, the optimal scale will be point G. 
 
Now we come to the law.  When the externalized benefits and externalized costs 
associated with the actor’s activity (or the costs externalized by both injurer and 
victim) are roughly the same, as in B, the negligence rule is optimal.  The reason is 
that the negligence rule imposes no liability on the actor when he exercises 
reasonable care, as assumed.  Since the negligence rule imposes no liability on the 
actor when he exercises reasonable care, and since it is assumed that he will exercise 
reasonable care, liability will not distort his activity level choice away from the 
socially optimal scale (the scale associated with point A and B). 
 
An equally important point is that when the externalized costs and externalized 
benefits connected to the actor’s activity are the same, or when there is a reciprocal 
exchange of externalized costs, the actor should owe a duty of care to the potential 
victim.  Of course, if the actor’s externalized costs are greater than his externalized 
benefits, the duty of care is still socially desirable. 
 
                                                 
20 Consider the following unitization rationale.  Imagine two firms imposing reciprocal costs of $1 per 
month on each other.  If the firms merged, would they require a transfer of $1, both ways, between the 
merged units?  No, because it would have no effect on the incentives of relevant actors.  By the same 
reasoning, when two actors impose the same costs, imposing strict liability on both would not alter 
their activity levels. 
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A strict liability rule would force the actor to pay for the external costs generated by 
his activity, whether or not he had taken care.  As a result, the actor would exercise 
reasonable care, just as he would under the negligence rule.  However, in addition to 
inducing care, strict liability affects the actor’s activity scale decision.  Under strict 
liability, the actor’s cost schedule becomes the marginal social cost schedule, which 
represents the sum of private and external costs.  If external costs are large relative to 
external benefits, the actor’s privately optimal scale will be point E.  This is not 
necessarily the same as the socially optimal scale.  If there are relatively modest 
external benefits, the socially optimal scale is the activity level associated with point 
C.  However, it is closer to the socially optimal scale than is the scale associated with 
point A, and for this reason represents a desirable scale change caused by the 
imposition of strict liability. 
 
Consider, for example, the keeping of wild animals.  In most cases, keeping a lion in 
your backyard imposes a risk on your neighbors that is far in excess of any benefit 
they may receive from the novelty of observing a lion from close range.  The law 
imposes strict liability in order to discourage the activity, even if you have 
surrounded the lion with an impenetrable steel cage.  However, if you are operating a 
zoo, some courts have held that the negligence rule applies.21  The reason is that the 
public benefits offered by the zoo are substantial.  The ratio of externalized risk to 
externalized benefit is much lower in the case of the zoo than in the case of the 
individual who keeps a lion in his backyard. 
 
A no-duty rule would relieve the actor of a duty to take care, which subsidizes his 
activity.  To see the subsidization effect, compare this case to that of the negligence 
rule.  Recall that under the negligence rule, the actor faces no costs from liability 
because he takes care.  However, even in the case of the negligence rule the actor 
bears the cost of taking care.  The no-duty rule subsidizes the actor by relieving him 
of the cost of taking care.  This is equivalent to shifting the actor’s private marginal 
cost schedule down, resulting in a new scale choice of F.  
 
Could a no-duty rule be socially desirable?  Consider the case in which the external 
benefits associated with the actor’s activity are large (represented in the figure by 
MSB (high externality)), and the external costs are relatively modest (represented by 
the schedule labeled MSC (low externality)).  The socially optimal scale of the 
activity is that associated with point G.  Subsidizing the actor by relieving him of a 
duty to take care shifts his private marginal cost schedule down, resulting in scale 
choice F.  Since the scale associated with F is close to the scale associated with G, 
the subsidy results in an optimal shift in the actor’s preferred scale of activity.  In 
other words, the no-duty rule is socially desirable in this case. 
 
What if the external costs are so large that the marginal social benefit schedule, 
representing the sum of private and external costs, moves so high upward that it no 
                                                 
21 Guzzi v. New York Zoological Society, 182 N.Y.S. 257 (N.Y. App. Div. 1920), aff’d, 233 N.Y. 511 
(1922); City of Denver v. Kennedy, 29 Colo. App. 15, 476 P.2d 762 (1970), after remand, 31 Colo. 
App. 561, 506 P.2d 764 (1972). 
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longer crosses the marginal social benefit schedule (see MSC (very high 
externality)in Figure 1)?  This is the case in which costs are so high relative to 
benefits that the optimal scale of the activity is zero.  In this case, a property rule 
rather than a liability rule is desirable.22  A property rule prohibits the actor’s activity 
altogether rather than simply internalizing the costs it generates.23  An example of 
this last scenario is reckless conduct.  Recklessly endangering the lives of others is a 
tort and also a violation of the criminal law in most states.  The law aims to go 
beyond internalizing costs in the case of reckless conduct.  The law aims to prohibit 
it. 
 
Note that this theory suggests that negligence is appropriate when and only when 
there is a rough equality between externalized cost and externalized benefit.  If there 
is no such equality, as in point E, there is no economic or utilitarian basis for 
choosing the negligence rule instead of strict liability. 
 
In addition to the subsidization function illustrated in Figure 1 (see F), no-duty rules 
also serve as complements to property rules.  Thus, when conduct by an injurer 
against a victim is prohibited by a property rule, we will see that corresponding 
conduct by the victim against the injurer is often governed by a no-duty rule. 
 
The foregoing functions of no-duty rules correct market failures or missing markets.  
Another function of no-duty rules is to simply permit markets to optimally regulate 
activity levels.  In some instances, we will see below, the imposition of a duty of care 
(negligence liability) may distort the activity level choice away from the socially 
optimal level.  One setting in which this occurs is when the actors can observe 
external costs and benefits and take them into account in contracting decisions.  
When informed actors are aware of potential external costs, and can effectively 
contract over both the scale of activity and the level of care, imposing liability may 
distort activity levels by preventing parties from contracting over the care level.  
Conversely, there are settings where, because of informational asymmetry, imposing 
negligence liability for a certain type of loss distorts the market. 
 
The three functions of no-duty rules are (1) to provide subsidization, (2) to serve as 
complements to property rules, and (3) to permit the market to regulate activity 
levels without distortions created by liability.  The first and third functions, as will be 
clear shortly, are quite similar.  The foregoing analysis is a skeletal discussion of the 
functions of duty rules and strict liability.  In the next section I will consider cases 
and describe how they fit within the skeletal structure developed to this point. 
 
                                                 
22 On property rules and liability rules, see Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 6; Louis Kaplow and 
Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 713 
(1996); Hylton, Property Rules and Liability Rules, Once Again, available in SSRN electronic library. 
23 Calabresi and Melamed, at 1092. 
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III. Applications   
 
A. Complements to Property Rules: Duties to Trespassers and to the Reckless 
 
1. Trespasses to Property 
 
Some “no duty” rules in tort law are simply complements to property rules.  The rule 
that a landowner owes no duty of care to a trespasser is an example of such a 
complementary property rule.24 
 
Trespass law is a property rule in the sense that it permits the landowner to enjoin the 
trespasser and to seek damages.  The power to enjoin forces the would-be trespasser 
to bargain for access to the landowner’s property.  The injunction power protects the 
subjective valuation of the landowner, because if the trespasser could invade the 
landowner’s property and be required to do no more than pay compensatory 
damages, the subjective portion of the landowner’s valuation would not be protected 
by the law. 
 
The rules regarding duties of landowners to trespassers are surprisingly complicated.  
The landowner owes no duty to take care to avoid an injury to the trespasser.  Thus, 
if the landowner has a patch of quicksand on his property, he does not have a duty to 
warn the trespasser to avoid the quicksand.  However, the landowner is not permitted 
to intentionally injure the trespasser, or to lay traps for him.25  Moreover, if the 
landowner attempts to remove the trespasser, he must use force that is reasonable in 
light of the circumstances.26  Thus, the no-duty rule regarding trespassers is coupled 
under the law with a reasonable force rule governing the landowner’s intentional 
conduct toward the trespasser. 
 
The law on trespass, then, has the following general form.  A property rule governs 
trespass.  The property rule allows the landowner to enjoin and to seek damages for 
invasions.  As a complement to that property rule, there is a no-duty-of-care rule that 
applies to the landowner.  The property-complement rule also contains a reasonable 
force requirement that bars certain intentional torts committed by the landowner 
against the trespasser. 
 
Continuing with the effort to generalize the law on trespass, we may say that it 
consists of a property rule, which enjoins potential trespassers and imposes strict 
liability against trespassers, and property-complement rule, which relieves 
landowners of the duty of care and imposes liability for unreasonable uses of force 
by the landowner. 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., Robert Addie & Sons (Colleries), Ltd. V. Dumbreck, [1929] A.C. 358; Buch v. Amory 
Manufacturing Co. 44 A. 809 (N.H. 1897); Turbeville v. Mobile Light & R. Co., 221 Ala. 91, 127 So. 
519 (1930); William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of  Torts 357 (4th 1971) 
25 E.g., Robert Addie & Sons, [1929] A.C. 358, 367. 
26 M’Ilvoy v. Cockran, 2 A.K. Marsh 271 (Ky. 1820); Bird v. Holbrook, 130 Eng. Rep. 911 (C.P. 
1825). 
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The purpose of the property-complement rule is easy to see.  It relieves the 
landowner of a duty of care to the trespasser in order to protect the landowner’s 
subjective valuation of his property.  In other words, the no-duty-toward-trespassers 
rule serves the same function as the injunction right in trespass law.  If landowners 
owed a duty of care to trespassers, they would have to invest resources into 
preventing harm to trespassers.  Since trespassers can arrive from many different 
directions – they don’t generally choose the front gate as the point at which to invade 
– a duty to prevent harm could impose enormous costs on the landowner.  Since the 
required investments would be made to benefit the trespasser, a duty of care toward 
trespassers would effectively transfer part of the landowner’s valuation of his 
property to the trespasser.  This obviously contradicts the function of the property 
rule.  If trespassers desire protection against defective conditions or other lapses in 
care on the landowner’s property, they should bargain for it.  The property-
complement rule effectively forces potential trespassers to bargain for the protection 
that a duty of care would give them. 
 
The reasonable force rule can be viewed as an implication of a more basic property 
rule, the one prohibiting intentional batteries.  The fact that a trespasser winds up on 
your property does not give you the right to shoot him with a rifle or run him through 
with a spear.  On the other hand, some force used to remove the trespasser is 
permitted or privileged, again as a complement to the underlying property rule. 
 
 As an illustration of the function of the no-duty rule, consider Gladon v. Greater 
Cleveland Regional Transit Authority.27  The plaintiff, Gladon, had been beaten up 
by two men while waiting for a train and had been left on the tracks with his leg 
draped over one of the rails.  An approaching train failed to break in time, causing 
severe injuries.  Although he did not intentionally walk onto the tracks, he got there 
through no fault of the railroad.  The court classified him as a trespasser and held that 
the railroad owed no duty to discover and avoid injuring him. 
 
The plaintiff in Gladon offered a sympathetic case for compensation.  However, a 
rule requiring the railroad to discover and avoid injury to a trespasser on the rails 
would impose an enormous burden on the railroad.  The duty would apply not only 
to unfortunate victims who slip or who are thrown onto the tracks, but also to risk-
seekers who choose to run along the tracks for the fun of it.  Perhaps it is enough to 
say that that is no way to run a railroad.  If it were feasible at all to continue to offer 
rail service under a duty to look out for trespassers on the rails, it would surely 
become an exorbitantly expensive service.  With a small client base – the result of 
cost increases passed on to customers – and substantial fixed costs, rail service 
would generally fail as a business or government service. 
 
Admittedly, the no-duty-to-trespassers rule seems harsh in many applications.  For 
example, in Buch v. Amory Manufacturing Co.,28 the court denied compensation to 
                                                 
27 75 Ohio St. 3d 312, 66 N.E. 2d 287 (1996). 
28 69 N.H. 257, 44 A. 809 (1898). 
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an eight-year-old boy who had followed his brother into a mill to learn his brother’s 
work.  The boy’s hand was crushed in a machine as his brother tried to teach him 
how to use it.  The court held that the boy was a trespasser and therefore not entitled 
to a warning about the dangers of the machines, which would have been obvious to 
an adult.  The result seems harsh given that the mill overseer knew of the boy’s 
presence and presumably could have put him out rather than let him continue to 
expose himself to great risk.29 
 
Harsh seeming cases involving the no-duty rule are the ones most likely to be 
litigated.  They are not necessarily representative of the rule’s operation in general.  
The function of the rule is better assessed in light of the case of an intentional 
trespasser who walks onto train tracks or into a manufacturing plant.  In these cases, 
property rules appear to be necessary parts of the organization of productive 
activities.  Railroads must be able to exclude others from their tracks and to use their 
tracks with the assumption of exclusive possession.  Manufacturers must be able to 
exclude pedestrians from their plants.  The no-duty-to-trespassers rule is simply a 
component of the property rules that facilitate productive efforts. 
 
2. Trespasses to the Person 
 
If the no-duty-to-trespassers rule is simply a part of the structure of property rules, an 
analogous rule must exist in the case of trespasses to the person.  Property rule 
protection – that is, the power to enjoin and to hold liable – exists for real property 
and for personal integrity too. 
 
Consider false imprisonment.  The wrongful detainor’s position is similar to that of a 
trespasser on real property.  I am assuming, of course, that the detention is without 
justification.  In other words, this example assumes that the detainor cannot justify 
his decision to imprison the victim by some claim that he needed to confine the 
victim in order to investigate the loss of personal property or to prevent an 
intentional tort at the hands of the detainee.30 
 
To make the comparison reasonably close, assume the detainor has not yet confined 
the victim.  The detainor is approaching the victim, with an apparent aim to confine 
him.  Suppose the potential victim has been infected by some highly communicable 
disease – the SARS virus or Ebola – that would be communicated to the detainor if 
the detainor carries out his plan.  The theory of this paper implies that the potential 
victim has no duty to warn the detainor of the risk. 
 
One could justify this answer in narrow economic terms by saying that “moral 
hazard” would be introduced by a rule imposing a duty on the potential victim to 
                                                 
29 The mill overseer ordered the boy to leave after he had assisted the other employees, in full view of 
the overseer, for roughly a day and half.  The boy did not leave and was injured soon after being 
ordered to leave. 
30 See, e.g., Kirby v. Foster, 22 A. 1111 (R.I. 1891); Coblyn v. Kennedy’s Inc., 268 N.E,2d 860 
(Mass. 1971). 
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warn a kidnapper of the risk of contracting a disease.  The same could be said of a 
rule that requires trains to look out for unauthorized individuals on their tracks; that 
it creates the moral hazard of encouraging risk-seekers to stroll on train tracks.  But 
the moral hazard argument presupposes a noncommittal view of the underlying 
property rights.  If the underlying property rights are fixed, as they are by the law, 
then any duty to warn a trespasser necessarily implies a weakening of those rights, 
and a corresponding transfer of value.  Property rules are designed precisely to 
prohibit such a transfer of value. 
 
Once the detainor has apprehended or captured his victim, the victim earns the right 
to use force to prevent the capture or to escape.  The use of force is privileged to the 
extent that it is reasonable in light of circumstances.  Deadly force may be privileged 
in some instances.  Questions of care in the course of defending oneself from a 
kidnapping are largely resolved by the reasonable force requirement of the law.  
 
Suppose, however, that the potential victim uses reasonable force against the 
detainor, and an injury results because of some danger that the potential victim failed 
to observe.  Suppose, to take a concrete example, the victim pushes the detainor in 
order to escape his grasp, and the detainor falls on a bed of nails and is severely 
injured.  If the victim had taken a second more to observe his surroundings, he would 
have noticed the bed of nails, and may have chosen to push the detainor in a different 
direction.   
 
Would the detainor, in this scenario, have an action for negligence in self-defense?  
Such an action would assume that the potential victim had a duty to avoid carelessly 
injuring the attacker in addition to the requirement of reasonable force.  Although the 
institution of insurance has given rise to claims of negligent self-defense, such a 
claim would appear to be inconsistent with the underlying theory of property-rule 
protection. 
 
3. Reckless Conduct 
 
The preceding property-complement rule examples have dealt with events that can 
be described as “takings” in some sense.  A trespass to real or to personal property is 
a taking in the sense that the taker expropriates something of value, exclusive 
possession, from the victim in a circumstance in which the taker could have 
bargained for consent.  The same general description applies to trespasses to the 
person, such as wrongful imprisonment or battery.  Property rules apply in these 
circumstances because they force potential invaders to seek consent from the 
property owner.  Property rules apply in these circumstances, as Calabresi and 
Melamed demonstrated,31 precisely because transaction costs are low. 
 
There is another set of circumstances in which property rules should apply.  That is 
when the actor’s conduct is socially undesirable no matter the scale.  In other words, 
the socially desirable scale of the activity is zero.  This is the case in which marginal 
                                                 
31 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 6. 
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social cost of the actor’s activity is so high that it is always greater than its marginal 
social benefit (see Figure 1, MSC (very high externality)).  The standard is example 
is reckless conduct; for example, driving against the direction of traffic, or playing 
with a loaded gun in a crowded area. 
 
As a general rule, contributory negligence is not permitted as a defense to a claim of 
recklessness.32  Translating this rule to the language of duty, this is equivalent to 
saying that the victim of reckless conduct owes no duty of care toward the reckless 
actor.  The duty imposed on X to take care to avoid injury to Y is suspended when X 
is a potential victim and Y is acting recklessly.  To take a concrete example, suppose 
X is carelessly looking at a highway billboard rather than the road while driving.  Y is 
recklessly driving at a high speed against the highway traffic direction.  If Y smashes 
into X, Y will be barred from asserting contributory negligence against X even though 
X might have avoided the injury if he were not staring at the billboard. 
 
The rule relieving the victim of reckless conduct of the duty of care relative to the 
injurer is a property-complement rule, which serves essentially the same function as 
the previous property-complement rules examined.  It prevents the subsidization of 
conduct to which a property-rule prohibition applies. 
 
 
B. Subsidization through Law and Related Goals 
 
1. Rescue Attempts 
 
Rescue appears to have a special status in tort law.  The law attempts to encourage or 
subsidize rescue efforts.  At the same time, the law makes a special effort to avoid 
imposing penalties on individuals who refuse to rescue.  The approaches appear 
contradictory at first glance, but can be reconciled within the framework of this 
paper. 
 
Let us start with the law governing rescue attempts.  Courts have held that someone 
who attempts a rescue cannot be held guilty of contributory negligence unless he has 
acted in a rash or reckless manner.33  In other words, the duty of care that one owes 
oneself, and that courts regularly enforce, is suspended in the case of rescue.  The 
rescuer owes no duty to take reasonable care to avoid injuring himself. 
 
In Eckert v. Long Island R.R.,34 the plaintiff’s decedent saw a child standing on a 
train track as a train approached, running in reverse.  The decedent ran to the track 
and threw the child clear of it but was struck by the oncoming train.  There was 
evidence of negligence on the part of the railroad.  The railroad argued in defense 
that the decedent was contributorily negligent because he had voluntarily put himself 
in the way of the train.  The court held that the plaintiff’s decedent would not be 
                                                 
32 William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 426 (4th ed. 1971) 
33 See, e.g., Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871). 
34 43 N.Y. 502 (1871). 
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deemed contibutorily negligent unless his conduct was “such as to be regarded either 
rash or reckless.”35 
 
A similar question arose in Wagner v. International Ry.36  The plaintiff and his 
cousin boarded a train, and were unable to move away from the open doors because 
of the crowd.  The cousin was thrown overboard as the train crossed a bridge.  The 
plaintiff was allowed to walk along the bridge, to look for his cousin’s body.  He lost 
his footing and fell to the ground below, suffering injuries.  The defendant railroad 
argued that it should not be held responsible for the injuries to the rescuer because 
his intervention, which was not reflexive or impulsive but was preceded by several 
minutes in which he could consider the risks and benefits of attempting to rescue, 
severed the chain of causation between their initial negligence and the rescuer’s 
injury.  Cardozo, citing Eckert, held that the rescuer’s intervention should be 
considered a natural and foreseeable result, unless his actions were reckless. 
 
In terms of the skeletal theory offered in the previous part, the rule that a rescuer has 
no duty of care on his own behalf is consistent with the subsidization function of no-
duty rules (see Figure 1, point F).  By relieving rescuers of the duty to take care for 
their own safety, courts effectively subsidize rescue attempts.  This is justifiable on 
the theory that the societal benefits of high-stakes altruism are substantial.37 
 
The fact the rescuers hardly ever think about the possibility of receiving 
compensation does not clearly undermine this account of the rule relieving the 
rescuer of a duty to care for his own safety.  All that is necessary for this theory to fit 
the reasoning of the cases is that courts recognize that high-stakes altruism provides 
a substantial social benefit relative to other activities.  That recognition alone is 
sufficient to justify the decision by courts to relieve rescuers of the duty of self-care, 
and that recognition is apparent in the reasoning of Eckert.38 
 
Since the subsidization function of the no-duty rule is so clear in the case of rescue, 
this is a good place to consider one other area of the law in which the no-duty rule’s 
subsidization function is equally clear.  The subsidization function is perhaps most 
obvious in settings in which aggressive conduct is permitted or encouraged.  The two 
most obvious examples are violent sports and courtroom litigation.  There is no duty 
imposed on a football player to take care to avoid injuring an opponent.39  No duty is 
imposed on an attorney to take care to avoid causing unnecessary harm to an 
adversary in litigation.40  The reason is the same in both cases.  Aggressive conduct 
                                                 
35 43 N.Y., at 506. 
36 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921). 
37 Certainly society behaves as if the social benefits of high-stakes altruism are substantial, see e.g. 
E.O. Wilson, On Human Nature 149-150 (1978).  Perhaps the reason we reward altruism so 
consistently is because some level of reciprocal altruism is necessary in a well-functioning society. 
38 The law has so high a regard for human life that it will not impute negligence to an effort to 
preserve it…” Eckert, 43 N.Y., at 506. 
39 Hackbart v. Cincinatti Bengals, Inc. 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979); Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E. 
2d 258 (Ill. App. 1975). 
40 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts, § 488, 1397 (2000). 
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toward adversaries is considered socially desirable in both settings.  A duty of care 
toward adversaries would discourage precisely the sort of conduct that society 
demands of participants. 
 
2. The Duty to Rescue 
 
Although tort law subsidizes rescue, it avoids imposing a duty to rescue.  Indeed, the 
general default rule in tort law is that there is no duty to rescue.  How can we 
reconcile the subsidization provided by the law governing rescue attempts (Eckert, 
Wagner) with the law’s refusal to require rescue? 
 
Before explaining how the no-duty-to-rescue rule (or the “rescue rule”) fits within 
this framework, I should mention two preliminary matters.  First, the rescue rule has 
exceptions.  One exception imposes a duty on an individual who starts to rescue a 
victim and then abandons the effort, leaving the victim in a position probably worse 
than if the rescuer had never attempted to help.41  Another exception imposes a duty 
to rescue when you have harmed someone in a way that leaves the victim helpless 
and in danger of further harm.42  Another exception is the case in which the actor’s 
conduct, negligent or not, creates a dangerous condition for the potential victim.43 
 
The second preliminary matter is that the rescue rule should be judged in terms of its 
impact in obvious and common circumstances rather than the fact patterns that 
appear in the cases.  The reported cases involving the rule tend to be the most 
difficult ones on which to justify it.  That is not a coincidence.  The cases that are 
most likely to be litigated, and reported in casebooks, are those involving the most 
troubling applications of the rule.  For example, Buch is a troubling outcome, 
viewing it as a rescue case.  The mill overseer in Buch could have acted more 
forcefully to bar the eight year old victim from returning to the mill where his hand 
was later crushed.  The same can be said of Yania v. Bigan,44 where the defendant, 
Bigan, had taunted Yania to jump into the water in which he drowned.  Cases such as 
Buch and Yania are litigated precisely because they are troubling applications of 
generally well-accepted rules.45 
 
The most obvious setting in which the rescue rule operates is one in which the 
potential rescuer does nothing to create the danger in which the victim finds himself.  
Suppose, for example, the potential rescuer goes to the beach to read a book.  A 
stranger calls for help from the water.  The potential rescuer watches as the stranger 
drowns.  I will label this “the typical rescue scenario”. 
 
                                                 
41Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros., 287 N. Y.S. 134, 135 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1935); Black v. New York N. H. & 
H.R.R., 79 N. E. 797 (Mass. 1907)  
42 Summers v. Dominguez, 84 P.2d 237 (Cal. App. 1938). 
43 Montomery v. National Convoy & Trucking Co., 195 S.E. 247 (S.C. 1937). 
44 155 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1959). 
45 Another famous troubling application of the rescue rule is Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 
301 (1928) (Defendant rented canoe to intoxicated victim, then sat on the dock, equipped with boat 
and rope, and watched victim drown while smoking a cigarette). 
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The function of the rescue rule in the typical rescue scenario can be understood in 
terms of the theory set out earlier.  Ordinarily, a duty to take care is imposed when 
there is some reciprocal exchange between risk and benefit, or a reciprocal exchange 
of risks (see Figure 1, point B).  However, in the typical rescue scene, there is no 
reciprocal exchange of risks, or between risk and benefit.  The potential rescuer’s 
activity does not externalize any extraordinary risk to the potential victim.  To hold 
the potential rescuer liable for the victim’s drowning would be the same, in terms of 
activity level effects, as holding him liable for some random accident involving 
people with whom he has no connection. 
 
Sure, the potential rescuer could have prevented the harm to the victim.  But under 
the theory of tort liability offered here, a necessary condition for the imposition of a 
duty of care is that there be a reciprocal exchange between costs externalized by both 
the victim’s and the actor’s activity or between the costs and benefits of the actor’s 
activity.46  When there is no such reciprocal exchange because there is no substantial 
risk externalized by the actor’s activity, the duty of care acts as a tax on the actor’s 
activity.  Tort law, however, avoids taxing activities in the absence of an imbalance 
between externalized costs and benefits or a nonreciprocal exchange of risk.  It 
follows that a duty to rescue would be an unjustifiable tax on the potential rescuer’s 
activity. 
 
Consider, for example, Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School District,47 where the 
plaintiff pedestrian was injured by a recklessly driving student on the way out of the 
high school parking lot.  The plaintiff sued the school district on the theory that it 
had a duty to supervise the student.  The school district officials, however, did not 
know, nor had reason to know, of the student’s recklessness.  The court held that the 
school district had no duty to supervise the student under these circumstances.  
Although framed as a standard negligence claim, it is essentially a rescue case.  The 
outcome is justifiable under the theory of this paper, because the school district, by 
enrolling the student, did not introduce a risk to pedestrians that was any greater than 
the background risk that the state had already introduced by licensing young drivers 
 
If this theory explains the absence of a duty to rescue in the typical rescue scenario, it 
should also explain the exceptions.  Consider the exception that applies when the 
potential rescuer takes the victim away from other potential rescuers and then fails to 
carry through with reasonable care.  For example, suppose the potential rescuer 
sequesters the victim of an illness or of a beating, so that others cannot provide help, 
and simply allows the victim to suffer,48 perhaps in a misguided effort to help.  The 
potential rescuer’s conduct in this case dramatically increases the risk of harm to the 
victim – at least in comparison to doing nothing.  This changes the exchange 
                                                 
46 If the actor’s activity imposes a much greater external cost than external benefit, a duty of care is 
socially desirable too.  But in that case, strict liability is also desirable in order to suppress the activity.  
For this reason, I describe the reciprocal exchange case is a necessary or minimum condition for the 
imposition of a duty of care. 
47 19 Cal. 4th 925 (1998). 
48 See, e.g., Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros., 287 N. Y.S. 134 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1935). 
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between externalized risk and benefit in a manner that justifies the imposition of a 
duty of care. 
 
3. Duties toward Licensees and Invitees 
 
In addition to the rule that says that a landowner owes no duty of care to a trespasser, 
the law traditionally has distinguished the duties owed to a licensee and to an invitee.  
The landowner owes a general duty of care to the invitee.  To the licensee, the 
landowner has a duty to inform or correct defective conditions in the property of 
which the landowner is aware.  However, the landowner has no duty, with respect to 
the licensee, to investigate and discover defective conditions.  In brief, the 
landowner’s duties to the invitee and licensee are the same except that the landowner 
owes to the invitee, and not to the licensee, a duty to make a reasonable inspection 
for potential hazards. 
 
The function of this distinction is the same as the previous ones considered: to 
optimally regulate activity levels.  Optimal regulation of activity levels generally 
means allowing markets or quasi-markets to function without distortions of liability.  
On the other hand, where substantial imbalances in externalized risks and benefits 
exist, optimal regulation of activity levels requires the imposition of strict liability, 
or, in other cases, subsidization through exemption from liability (no-duty rule). 
 
The key difference between the invitee and the licensee is that the licensee, under the 
law, assumes the risk of latent defects on the property of which the landowner is 
unaware.  The invitee does not assume the risk.  We could also view this difference 
as a subsidy created by the law.  The law appears to subsidize the landowner to some 
extent in his relationship with the licensee.  Alternatively, or equivalently, we could 
view the law as taxing the landowner in his relationship with the invitee by imposing 
strict liability for latent defects.  Either view could be defended in the context of this 
model.  Does the law make sense in terms of the model of this paper? 
 
First, consider the invitee.  The invitee visits for a business reason.  For example, an 
invitee might be the repairman who visits the landowner’s house in order to repair 
the central air conditioning system.  To do so, he may have to climb up to the attic, 
where defective conditions might exist that would ordinarily not come to the 
attention of the owner.  Since the invitee is likely to be unaware of any particular 
conditions on the landowner’s property, and typically does not have the freedom to 
choose where he will go on the property, there is no hypothetical-contract basis for 
treating him as one who has assumed the risk of latent defects.  Moreover, in most 
such relationships it is assumed that all of the costs and benefits are recognized in the 
contract.  There are no external costs and benefits, or if so, they are trivial.  There is 
no reason in this setting to adopt a subsidy of any sort for either party.  The general 
negligence test should apply, as it does. 
 
Even though the general negligence test applies to the invitee case, it operates much 
like a rule holding the landowner strictly liable for latent defects.  The reason for this 
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is that the burden of preventing latent defects from occurring is probably too high to 
be met.  Preventing latent defects from occurring requires nondurable precaution – 
that is, precaution that is almost continual monitoring and investment.  As Mark 
Grady has argued, rules that impose a duty to take nondurable precaution often 
operate in effect like strict liability.49 
 
To the extent that the duty, owed to the invitee, to prevent latent defects from 
occurring acts like strict liability, it is still defensible within the context of this 
model.  The reason is that the invitee does not have enough information to assume 
the risk with respect to such defects.  A rule relieving the landowner of liability for 
such defects would lead to overexposure to or “overconsumption” of risk on the part 
of the invitee.  This is analogous to the case of the consumer who, in the absence of 
strict products liability, consumes a risky product without knowing its 
characteristics.50  Imposing liability for latent defects effectively controls the activity 
level chosen jointly by the landowner and invitee, by internalizing the cost of latent 
defects to the landowner. 
   
Next, consider the licensee.  The licensee is typically a social guest.  Unlike the 
invitee, the social guest often knows something about the condition of the 
landowner’s property, and, if not, at least intends to assume a wide privilege to enjoy 
the property when he arrives to it.  The invitee does not have to climb up to the 
landowner’s attic, and if he does so, it is usually without any compulsion.  The 
licensee often has enough information, or makes voluntary decisions as if he has 
enough information, to make an informed decision to confront the risk of a defective 
condition in the property.  There is a hypothetical-contract basis for treating him as 
one who has assumed the risk.  Given this, the licensee does not overconsume risk in 
his relationship with the landowner, and therefore there is no basis for internalizing 
the cost of latent defects to the landowner.  Moreover, in most such relationships 
there is an imbalanced exchange between costs and benefits.  The licensee typically 
enjoys the benefits – he has come to the landowner’s property for that reason, 
perhaps, for example, to swim in the landowner’s pool – and the benefits are funded 
by the landowner.  The law can bring about a closer equality between the exchange 
of costs and benefits (externalized or not mediated through the price system) by 
providing a subsidy to the landowner, which it does in the form of the rule relieving 
the landowner of a duty to inspect for defective conditions. 
 
These arguments suggest that as a default rule, the traditional distinction between 
invitees and licensees can be justified in terms of its impact on activity level 
decisions.  The assumption of risk component is in accord with typical conditions 
and allows the quasi-market in “social exchange” to function without being distorted 
by the liability rule.  The narrow no-duty rule with respect to licensees is justifiable 
in light of the licensee’s knowledge of risk and the exchange between 
uncompensated benefits and costs among the parties. 
 
                                                 
49 Mark F. Grady, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 887, 909-12 (1994). 
50 James Buchanan, In Defense of Caveat Emptor, 38 U Chi L. Rev 74 (1970). 
 20
This analysis points to key factors that should determine the distinction between 
invitees and licensees.  First, the victim should have exercised a free choice about 
where to go on the landowner’s property.  The exercise of a voluntary decision, 
rather than one compelled by a prior contractual commitment made in the dark as to 
the conditions of the property, justifies the law’s decision to treat the victim as 
having assumed the risk.  Second, there should be an observable uncompensated 
exchange in which the licensee is the net beneficiary. 
 
The law is not uniformly viewed even among states that apply the traditional rule 
because of conflicts between these underlying factors.  In many cases, the licensee is 
the one who provides the benefit to the landowner; while at the same time the 
licensee exercises a free choice over where he will go on the property.   
 
For example, in Lemon v. Busey,51 the plaintiff grandmother, a part-time church 
employee, brought her five-year-old granddaughter to the church while she worked 
there.  The child wandered off and fell to her death from the roof of the church.  The 
court held that the plaintiff was a licensee and rejected her claim on the ground that 
the church had no duty to inspect for dangerous conditions that might not be 
apparent to the eyes of a five-year-old.  Needless to say, Lemon is a troubling 
outcome because the grandmother deserved to be treated as an invitee.  The church 
provided a benefit beyond the basic contract by permitting the plaintiff to bring her 
granddaughter with her, but this concession may have simply been necessary to get 
her to work.  In other words, the agreement to bring the granddaughter may have 
been a part of the employment contract, which implies that there was no 
uncompensated benefit given to the plaintiff. 
 
Another set of cases in which courts have shown confusion over the licensee-invitee 
distinction are those in which a social guest comes over to the landowner’s property 
to help with some project, and is injured as the result of a hidden defective condition.  
For example, in Burrell v. Meads,52 the homeowner and a friend were installing a 
ceiling in the homeowner’s garage.  The friend climbed up to the rafters, and after 
handing some items to the homeowner, walked across something he thought was 
plywood but was not.  The friend fell to the garage floor, suffering severe injuries.  
The court rejected the traditional categorization and treated the friend as an invitee. 
 
4. Landlords and Tenants 
 
Traditional common law regarding the landlord’s liability holds the landlord liable 
for injuries “resulting from defective and dangerous conditions in the premises if the 
injury [was] attributable to (1) a hidden danger in the premises of which the landlord 
but not the tenant is aware, (2) premises leased for public use, (3) premises retained 
under the landlord’s control, such as common stairways, or (4) premises negligently 
                                                 
51 461 P.2d 145 (Kan. 1969). 
52 569 N.E.2d 637 (Ind. 1991). 
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repaired by the landlord”.53  The traditional law can be explained by the framework 
of this paper. 
 
The explanation for the traditional law regarding the liability of landlords begins 
with the observation that all observable costs and benefits will typically be taken into 
account in the contracting stage between the parties.  If the general state of the 
property is obvious to the tenants, the market will result in a price that compensates 
for the risk accepted by the tenant, relative to some safer alternative.  Under this 
assumption, there would be no substantial externalized costs or benefits – because all 
costs and benefits will be taken into account in setting the terms of the contract.  This 
implies that the proper default liability rule is negligence (Figure 1, point B or A).54 
 
The default rule of negligence is consistent with the traditional law’s treatment of the 
landlord’s duty to tenants in spaces under the landlord’s control, such as common 
areas.  The law puts a general duty of care on the landlord, which implies a duty to 
fix defective conditions when the landlord is aware of them and the tenant is not, and 
to make reasonable inspections for defective conditions.  In other words, the tenant is 
treated as an invitee in common areas.  Of course, this is a default rule.  Presumably 
the tenant could bargain for a less generous treatment if he preferred a discount on 
the rental charge in exchange for waiving any claims for liability in connection with 
defective conditions in common areas. 
 
While the traditional law treats the tenant as an invitee in common areas, it treats the 
tenant as licensee in the space which he occupies.  What explains the difference?  
Unlike the traditional invitee-licensee distinction, there is no general imbalance in 
uncompensated benefits and costs in the landlord-tenant relationship.  The entire 
exchange is mediated through the price system.  However, there is a hypothetical-
contract basis for treating the tenant as having assumed some risk with respect to the 
space that the tenant occupies.  The tenant is likely to have as much information or 
more than does the landlord as to defective conditions in the area he occupies.  He is 
in a position to offer a price that reflects his assessment of the risk of the rental unit 
he occupies.  The tenant is in a position to demand an upgrade in the conditions of 
his rental unit in exchange for a higher rental charge. 
 
On the assumption that the tenant accurately observes the risk level, treating the 
tenant as a licensee in the rental unit that he occupies permits the market to assign 
different prices to different risk levels.  If the risk level of a unit is in general a 
function of the likelihood of a defective condition developing, then the rule relieving 
the landlord of a duty to inspect for defective conditions in the tenant’s unit permits 
the landlord and the tenant to contract over the risk level of the tenant’s unit.  
Consumer/tenants will offer lower bids for units with higher risk levels.  The sorting 
                                                 
53 Richard Epstein, Cases and Materials on Torts 582 (7th ed.) (citing Sargent v. Ross, 308 A. 2d 528, 
531 (N.H. 1973)). 
54 Point B in Figure 1 assumes there are insubstantial externalized risks and benefits, while point A 
assumes there are no externalized risks or benefits.  Either would fit as a description of this case. 
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of consumer/tenants according to risk preferences enhances consumer welfare 
relative to a rule that discourages sorting. 
 
The common areas that the landlord controls are distinguishable from the unit 
occupied by the tenant.  In common areas, it is unlikely that tenant has as much or 
more information on the risk level.  And even if the tenant is as well informed as the 
landlord on the risk level of the common areas, his incentives are quite different from 
the case in which he assesses the risk of his own unit.  The level of safety in the 
common area is a public good, and this diminishes the extent to which the risk level 
will be made a part of the contracting process between the landlord and the tenant.  
While the tenant may exit if he finds the risk level too high in the common area, he 
will have weak incentives to offer a higher bid in exchange for a reduction in the risk 
level. 
 
If tenants were unable to accurately observe the risk level of a rental unit, this 
justification for the traditional common law governing landlord liability would be 
invalid.  If tenants could not observe or assess risk, allowing the tenant and landlord 
to contract over the risk level would result in overconsumption of risky rental units.  
A duty rule would be a desirable mechanism to push the level of consumption of 
risky rental units to a lower level. 
 
Consider, for example, the rule regarding premises leased for public use, which 
imposes on the landlord a general duty of care.  Suppose, for example, the landlord 
rents a space to be used for some specific function attended by people who are 
unfamiliar with the property.  In this case, the short-term tenants would have no 
reason to be aware of the risk level of the unit they temporarily occupy.  A rule 
treating them as licensees would lead to overconsumption of risk, since the short-
term tenants would not have taken the risk level into account at the contracting stage.  
The traditional common law appears to adopt the optimal regulatory response 
because it treats the short-term tenants as invitees.  In other words, the law 
recognizes that a market in which the risk level is priced is unlikely to develop in the 
short-term scenario.  Consequently, it treats the short-term occupants as invitees 
when the property is leased for public use. 
 
5. Duties of Landlords Continued: Obvious Conditions and Crime 
 
Even though landowners have a general duty of care to invitees, they are not liable to 
them for injuries resulting from obvious conditions.  Suppose, for example, a 
building owned by the landowner has such a low entryway that visitors bump their 
heads on the doorframe as they enter the building.  Since this is likely to be an 
obvious condition, something a visitor could easily see on his way toward the door, 
the landowner will often escape liability in these cases.  Similarly, the general duty 
owed by landlords to tenants in common areas is suspended in the case of obvious 
conditions. 
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There are straightforward reasons that a landowner is not held liable for obvious 
conditions.  The fact that the condition is obvious implies that there may be no need 
to employ liability in order to regulate activity level decisions.  Second, the injuries 
resulting from obvious conditions are typically due to the negligence of the victim. 
 
Crime is also an obvious condition, especially in urban areas.  However, in Kline v. 
1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.,55 the D.C. Circuit held that landlords 
have a duty to take steps to protect tenants from foreseeable criminal acts in common 
areas of the building.  The decision went against the earlier settled rule that a private 
person, whether landlord or not, does not have a duty to protect another from a 
criminal act. 
 
Kline is difficult to square with the framework of this paper, and could be treated as 
unjustifiable deviation from the traditional common law rule.  However, the decision 
has survived more than thirty years and is now the rule in most jurisdictions.  Are 
there conditions under which it might be seen as consistent with this paper’s 
framework? 
 
I noted earlier that defective conditions in common areas are less likely to be 
regulated optimally by the market.  The same can be said of safety from crime in 
common areas, since it is a public good.  Tenants have weak incentives to bargain for 
safety.  Suppose, for example, there are three tenants.  The cost of hiring a security 
guard is $1200 per week, or $400 per tenant if the cost is passed on in full.  Suppose 
one tenant is willing to pay an additional $700 per week for security.  If that one 
tenant knows that the other two are in favor of additional security and willing to pay 
the same amount, that tenant has an incentive to understate his desire for security, 
free-riding off the others.  Conversely, if one tenant knows that the other two are not 
willing to pay anything for a guard, he has no incentive to seek additional security, 
since his bid will not be sufficient to cover the cost.  The only case in which the one 
tenant has an incentive to state his preferences honestly is when his vote is pivotal to 
the decision.   
 
The argument that safety is unlikely to be regulated optimally by the market implies 
that landlords should have a duty to take steps to enhance safety.  This is simply a 
version of the argument for requiring a general duty of care to tenants in the common 
areas of the landlord’s building.  On the other hand, this argument is undercut by the 
fact that crime is typically an obvious condition. 
 
There is one key distinction between crime and other obvious conditions, such as a 
low doorframe, that might justify the decision in Kline.  Most obvious conditions in 
common areas are permanent conditions that are encountered frequently by the 
tenant.  Crime, in contrast, is observed infrequently and its rate of occurrence 
changes over time. 
 
                                                 
55 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
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In the case of a low doorframe, the tenant will observe the feature every day, and 
perhaps several times a day.  Moreover, in the vast majority of instances, accidents 
are not serious.  Most tenants tall enough to bump their heads against the doorframe 
will simply tell themselves to remember to duck the next time.  Obvious conditions 
in common areas can be described as high-probability-low-harm events.  They 
happen frequently without causing much harm in most cases. 
 
However, crime is observed infrequently and is quite harmful when it occurs.  The 
ability to learn of the risk is limited in this case.56  Moreover, even if the rate of 
occurrence is well known, that rate is a changing function of the opportunities 
presented.  One may assume that the probability of a tenant being victimized is a 
function of the overall vulnerability of the apartment building and the individual 
vulnerability of the victim.  The overall vulnerability of the apartment building 
depends on the relative proportions of old and young tenants, male and female 
tenants, and so on.  The individual vulnerability is a function of the victim’s age, sex, 
and other characteristics.  Changes in the composition of the apartment building will 
therefore affect the individual tenant’s likelihood of becoming a crime victim.  But 
these changes may be unobservable to the tenants.  This implies that the market may 
fail to bid down the rental charge in a manner that accurately reflects the likelihood 
of crime in any given time period and for any particular tenant.  Indeed, for an 
existing or incumbent tenant, the frequency of crime may be a latent defect from his 
or her perspective.  
 
The upshot of this argument is that Kline may, in spite of its apparent inconsistency 
with the traditional law, be consistent with the framework of this paper.  Crime is an 
obvious condition to any tenant, but not obvious in the same way as a low doorframe 
in a building entrance.  The reasons for thinking the market will price risk effectively 
in the case of most obvious conditions may not hold in the case of crime. 
 
6. Palsgraf and Proximate Cause 
 
As every law student knows, Cardozo’s opinion in Palsgraf defines the duty to take 
care as an obligation to foreseeable victims.  The underlying economic rationale is 
the same as that set out above for the rescue rule.  Imposing liability for harms to 
unforeseeable victims is equivalent to taxing the defendant’s activity.  This is 
desirable on economic grounds only when the risk externalized by the defendant’s 
activity is substantially greater than reciprocal risks accepted or benefits externalized 
by the actor. 
 
A visual picture of this argument can be described as follows.  Imagine that each 
actor is surrounded by a probabilistic cloud illustrating the risks externalized to 
                                                 
56 Early behavioral experiments by Skinner suggested that subjects learn the connection between 
action and reward (or punishment) through repeated interaction.  B.F. Skinner, Science and Human 
Behavior (1953).  Crime is an example of a punishment that occurs randomly and infrequently in 
response to failures to guard against it.  Potential victims are unlikely to accurately estimate, or act as 
if they had accurately estimated, the likelihood of crime occurring. 
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others when he is engaging in some activity with reasonable care.  When two actors 
are engaged in an activity such as driving, their clouds come into contact with each 
other.  The convergence of these clouds implies a duty to take care.  And since the 
risk clouds put equal impositions on one another, there is no need to tax one of the 
actors in order to reduce his activity level.  If an injury occurs from a traffic accident, 
the negligence rule should apply, as it does.  However, if the risk clouds never come 
into contact, then each of the actors is an unforeseeable victim, from the perspective 
of the other actor.  There is no basis in theory, and no basis in law under Palsgraf, 
for imposing a duty of care. 
 
The thought exercise just conducted could just as easily have been put in terms of 
proximate cause.  When the risk clouds do not come into contact, the victim of the 
accident is not foreseeable, and his claim for damages fails on proximate cause 
grounds.  Palsgraf elevated this basic component of proximate cause analysis, 
foreseeability, to the duty prong of the four-part negligence inquiry.  
 
As this suggests, all analyses that can be framed in terms of the foregoing thought 
exercise involving risk clouds – or “activity risk” – can be considered within the 
language of proximate cause.  That implies that the rescue rule cases could easily be 
analyzed as proximate cause cases.  However, it should not be a matter of 
indifference to courts whether to treat rescue, and foreseeability cases generally, as 
issues of duty or proximate cause.57  Duty rules are rules of law rather than the 
primarily fact-bound inquiry that determines proximate cause.   It follows that it 
makes sense to treat cases of activity risk under a duty analysis when it is desirable 
to minimize uncertainty surrounding the application of the rule.  The rescue rule 
appears desirable, in this light, because it minimizes the uncertainty that would be 
generated by an ill-defined duty to rescue.  On the other hand, the desirability of the 
Palsgraf rule, relative to the general proximate cause analysis, is open to question. 
 
The choice between duty and proximate cause analysis involves a trade off between 
uncertainty costs and flexibility.  Proximate cause analysis gives the court maximum 
flexibility to respond to a set of facts that suggest, to the court, that liability could be 
used to enhance incentives for care.  The cost of this flexibility is the uncertainty it 
creates over the scope of liability and the potential costs of erroneous impositions of 
liability.  It follows that a positive theory of the choice of duty doctrine as an 
alternative to proximate cause analysis is that it serves to minimize uncertainty costs.  
In other words, when a court, in the course of rejecting a claim for liability, uses the 
language of duty rather than that of proximate cause, it is implicitly saying that it 
considers the costs of uncertainty and erroneous impositions of liability to be greater 
than the flexibility and precision advantages of proximate cause analysis. 
 
7. A Final Application: Hadley v. Baxendale, Economic Loss, and Third-Party 
Beneficiaries 
 
                                                 
57 Hylton, Theory of Tort Doctrine, supra note 16. 
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The final application of this paper’s framework is to the economic loss problem.  
Consider a contract between X and Y to do something that affects Z.  For example, 
suppose, as in Robins Dry Dock v. Flint,58 the contract is between a ship owner, X, 
and a dry dock, Y, to repair a ship that is under contract to be leased to Z.  The dry 
dock negligently damages the ship, causing a substantial loss to the owner X and to 
Z. 
 
Hadley v. Baxendale provides the rule preventing X from recovering for the loss of 
revenue from his contract with Z, unless the prospect of that loss was brought clearly 
to the attention of X.  In X’s action against Y, the court will disallow recovery for the 
loss of the revenue from the contract with Z on the ground that it is not a foreseeable 
component of damages. 
 
Similarly, in Z’s tort action against Y, the court will deny any recovery whatsoever 
on the ground that Y is not under a duty of care to protect the economic returns of Z.  
That is the message of Robins Dry Dock.  It is a variation of the rule of Hadley.  The 
theory that explains Hadley also explains Robins Dry Dock.  The difference between 
the two cases is that the economic loss component is just a portion of the plaintiff’s 
claim in the Hadley-type setting, while it is the whole of the plaintiff’s claim in the 
Robins Dry Dock case. 
 
The general the rule (or rules) of Hadley and Robins Dry Dock can be defended on 
the ground that courts should relieve actors of a duty of care in instances when such 
a duty will distort market outcomes.  Hadley is easily explained in view of the 
adverse selection problem.59  Holding Y liable for the economic loss to X implies that 
Y will have to set a price that covers the mean economic loss.  But that means 
contracting parties similar to X whose losses are relatively low will find the contract 
unattractive, which increases the mean economic loss among the contacting parties 
who appear similar to X, forcing another revision in the contract price, and so on.  
The adverse selection problem that justifies the rule of Hadley also justifies the 
economic loss rule. 
 
It should be clear that the adverse selection theory also justifies the outcome in Moch 
Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.60  The defendant, a waterworks company, agreed to 
supply water to the city of Rensellaer, which would be used for sewer flushing, for 
service to public buildings, for service to fire hydrants, and other public purposes.  
The plaintiff’s warehouse burned down after the waterworks company, after 
receiving notice of the fire, failed to supply sufficient water to extinguish the fire.  
Cardozo’s opinion for the court held that the defendant did not have a duty to an 
entity that was not formally a party to the water supply contract. 
 
                                                 
58 275 U.S. 303 (1927). 
59 Lucian Bebchuk and Steven Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract, 
7 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 284 (1991); Ayres and Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic theory of default Rules, 99 Yale Law Journal 87 (1989). 
60 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928). 
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Cardozo’s broad proposition in Moch is better understood in connection with the 
facts of the case.  The waterworks company charged the city $42.50 a year for each 
hydrant.  If the city were held liable to city residents for the losses caused by fires, 
the fire-hydrant charge would have had to be set quite a bit higher, especially if the 
surrounding property included mansions or expensive commercial property.  
Moreover, the adverse selection process would immediately kick into gear: the 
higher the fire-hydrant charge, the higher the taxes necessary to cover the charges, 
and the less likely low-value properties would be capable of supporting the taxes. 
 
The general proposition of Moch appears to be that if A is in a contract to supply 
services to B which in turn benefit C, A has no duty to take care to avoid a loss to C.  
However, this is probably too broadly stated.  The Second Restatement’s Section 
324A, titled “liability to third person for negligent performance of undertaking,” 
appears to contradict it.61  The proposition of Moch should be understood to apply to 
the case in which C involves a large, difficult-to-define class of potential claimants, a 
setting in which the adverse selection problem is likely to arise.62 
 
  
IV. Conclusion 
 
A sense of skepticism toward the concept of duty pervades consequentialist analyses 
of tort law from Holmes to Posner.  The purpose of this paper is show that duty, both 
as an abstract concept and as a set of detailed rules for channeling tort liability, is 
easily reconcilable with utilitarian or economic approaches to tort doctrine.  Indeed, 
economic analysis provides perhaps the most thorough and consistent set of 
explanations for duty doctrine.  Duty doctrine appears to serve essentially three 
economic functions: subsidizing activities that have substantial external benefits, 
supporting or complementing property rules (in the Calabresi-Melamed sense), and 
permitting the market to regulate activity levels without distortions created by 
liability. 
 
 
                                                 
61 The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A provides: One who undertakes, gratuitously or for 
consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection 
of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting 
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise 
reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by 
the other to the third person, or (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third 
person upon the undertaking. 
62 For an interesting duty case raising similar market-allocation issues, see Great Central Insurance 
Co. v. Insurance Services Office Inc., 74 F.3d 778, 785 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J., “If a person 
injures another through culpable conduct such as negligence, why should not the innocent victim be 
able to shift his loss to the culpable injurer?  There is no altogether satisfactory answer to this 
question, but it is obvious that the law recoils from the full implications of it.  Considerations of 
policy have persuaded courts of all states to place limits on the scope of tort liability through the 
concept of duty.  The same considerations are in play here…. To subject [defendant] to unlimited 
liability for the consequences of … mistakes might be to jeopardize its existence of make it unduly 
timid about proposing less than astronomical rates.”)   
